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Signin' Them Papers: 
Summary Punishment in the Military 
by Jack Fuller 
Mr. Fuller is a second-year student at Yale Law School 
and an editor of the Yale Review of Law and Social 
Action. He Served 22 months as an enlisted man in the 
U.S. Army. 
He used to be a grocery boy or a graduate student. 
Now it made no difference which. Now he was a GI, a 
trooper, marching to his first hour of instruction in 
military justice. 
Bayonet training had ended for the day. He was 
hoarse from the screaming, from the growling by the 
numbers. He walked to the cadence. Now he was to 
learn justice. 
We are Charlie. 
WE ARE CHARLIE! 
Rough, tough Charlie. 
ROUGH, TOUGH CHARLIE! 
Ass-kicking Charlie. 
ASS-KICKING CHARLIE! 
They chanted as they marched. He sweated under his 
helmet liner. He leaned under the weight of his Ml4. 
The voices carommed off dirty yellow barracks that 
lined the road. Ass-kicking Charlie. A queer introit to 
an indoctrination in law. 
He had learned that the spirit of the bayonet was to 
Kill. Now he wondered what would label the spirit of 
the law. He clenched his teeth at the thought. A few 
weeks in the Army and he was already cynical as hell. 
They had shorn him of his hair, his civilian clothes 
and most of his selfrespect. They had kept him awake 
the first 48 hours of his military career, told him 
terrifying stories about the future, about the misery 
of basic training, the savagery of Vietnam. He had 
learned his lesson quickly. The spirit of the Anny is 
To Endure. 
To Endure you just had to be on your guard con-
stantly, to sneak and slide and make absolutely certain 
that neither the Army nor anyone in it ever got running 
room in your soul. So he had learned to stand stoic and 
take whatever abuse his superiors gave him. He had 
learned to scream by the numbers, to polish by the num-
bers, to defecate according to the training schedule. It 
was as if he had detached a small part of himself and 
sacrificed it to the Army in order to save the rest. 
And the Army had gladly accepted the offering. That 
part of him he had ceded to Army control had become 
petty, cowering, obsequious and mean. Despite his 
pacific nature, that one part of him had already 
learned to fight - if only yet for a place in the 
chow line. 
The company halted in a rolling, sandy field 
between a pine forest and a corrugated steel classroom. 
He quickly doffed his helmet liner and pistol belt, 
arranging them in rank and file on the ground as 
prescribed. He carefully leaned his M 14 against the 
helmet liner in the same angle and aim as every other 
rifle in the formation. He stood at attention. On 
command he doubletimed into the classroom screaming 
"C-NINE-TWO! C-NINE-TWO!" It was the name of 
his unit. 
"Taaaaake ... seats. " 
41 
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And the 200-odd men clattered into their desks. 
Within moments some were already asleep. But he would 
stay awake this hour, not because the drill sergeants . 
stalked about to enforce attentiveness but because he 
knew that the rules of military justice were to be the 
perimeters within which his two-year military marathon 
would be run. 
"All right men, this is your first hour of instruc-
tions in military justice. You 71 all want to listen 
careful and take notes. You 7e expected to know this 
stuff, "said the drill instructor. He introduced a 
captain, their company commander, who would give the 
lecture. 
The captain explained at length the three kinds of · 
courts-martial: Summary, special and general. The 
trainees rose to ascending plateaus of awe at the level . 
of hassle that would await them in each more severe 
procedure. He explained that soldiers have a right to 
keep silent after being charged with an offense. And 
1he explained that in addition to courts-martial, the 
Army has a thing called Article 15. It was part of 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice like the rest, 
he said, digressing to explain that in this case 
uni[ orm didn't mean the garments everyone in the room 
was wearing but rather "all the same" since the code 
applied to all branches of the armed service. 
Article 15, he said, was non-judicial punishment 
unlike courts-martial. It was the law that gave 
commanding officers the power to discipline a soldier" 
without going through a court. He said that a 
commanding officer would always give a soldier a choice 
between accepting the Article 15 punishment - the 
extent of which would not be specified in advance -
and going before a court-martial. The choice was 
required by the UCMJ, he said. The soldier would have 
time to decide,. usually 48 hours or less. 
If the soldier chose to accept the unspecified 
punishment he would be required to sign a statement to 
that effect, though signing the papers did not consti-
tute an admission of guilt. 
It "behooves the trooper" to take the Artiqle 15, 
the captain said, leaning forward on the podium to give 
an air of intimacy with his troops assembled. He 
explained why. First, the Article 15 does not ''follow 
you beyond the duty station, while a court-martial 
becomes a part of your record," he said. Second, the 
Article 15 does not count as a federal conviction. 
Third, when a soldier signs the Article 15 documents, 
the captain said, he does not admit that he was guilty 
of the offense. He only says he is willing to accept 
punishment. Finally, the captain said, punishments 
under Article 15 are less severe than under court-
martial jurisdiction. 
Then the captain repeated nearly the whole lecture 
and asked for questions. Some trainees asked some, and· 
the captain repeated parts of the lecture a third time. 
Then the class was over. 
"Fall out and fall in on your weapons, "barked . 
the sergeant. 
Everyone scrambled for the double doors out of the 
superheated classroom. As he ran out the door, the 
soldier nee grocery clerk or graduate student mulled 
over what had been said. Courts-martial: they were 
definitely to be avoided. But the Article 15, that 
wasn't the same. It wasn't quite so bad, but it could 
come at any time. It was more like an obstacle in the 
race than like a perimeter. He hu"ied to his combat 
gear. Behind him a sergeant~ voice bellowed in mock 
anger, "You'd better shake it up, troops. Shake it up or 
you 71 be signing them p_apers. " 
Signing them papers. 1 
The Article 15 is the only contact most servicemen 
have with military justice. Non-judil;ial punishment 
and the threat of it become a regular part of the 
draftee's (or short-term volunteer's) career. The 
average soldier who hopes only to endure his two or 
.three years of military service with as few scars as 
possible probably avoids the kinds of behavior that 
lead to courts-martial. But behavior that could lead to 
an Article 15 is virtually .unavoidable. Non-judicial 
punishment is given for badly polished belt buckles, 
for trivial insolence (real or imagined), for errors 
on the job, for sloppily-rolled socks. In theory 
commanding officers may only hand out non-judicial 
punishment for actual breaches of the Uniform Code of 
Military Jus~ce (UCMJ), but the system leaves the 
decision whether there has been a breach largely to the 
commanding officer himself. In practice, unit 
commanders use non-judicial punishment as the school-
marm used the birch switch. Quick, hard, obdurate. 
The" theory of summary punishment as a disciplinary 
tool of command did not originate with the adoption of 
the UCMJ in 1950, of course. Traditionally, all 
military justice devices were designed primarily to 
maintain strict discipline.2 Despite a refusal by 
the American Continental Congress in 1775 to include 
provisions for summary punishment (punishments without 
tria1)3 in the first American Articles of War, 
General George Washington and other Revolutionary Army 
commanders nevertheless issued general orders calling 
for immediate floggin·g and other summary punishments 
for such types of misconduct as plundering or firing a 
weapon without orders. In 1778 General Washington 
asked Congress for statuto:y authority to mete out 
suirimary punishment. In his letter to Congress of 
January 29, 1778, he wrote:4 
There are many little crimes and disorders incident to 
soldiery, which require immediate punishment and which from 
the multiplicity of them, if referred to Court Martials, 
would create endless trouble, and often escape proper notice: . 
These, when soldiers are detected in the fact, by the provost 
marshals, they ought to have a power to punish on the spot; 
subject to proper limitations and to such regulations, as the 
commander in chief according to customs and usages of War, 
shall, from time to time, introduce. 
Congress did not grant the authority. One military 
commentator has speculated that it may have assumed 
since Washington had already instituted summary 
corporal punishment he could continue to do so with-
out explicit statutory authority.5 Whether Con-
gress thought legislation superfluous or whether it 
considered summary punishment at odds with the 
principles of government it espoused, commanders 
received no statutory authority to impose summary 
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punishment until the adoption of the 1916 Articles of 
War.6 
In the interim, however, military commanders did 
not show any skittishness because of the vagueness of 
their authority to punish summarily. Corporal punish-
ment without trial was common. "One punishment (of the 
Civil War period) that must have been particularly 
· effective," wrote a military commentator, "was that 
of staking an offender on the ground and pouring 
molasses on his hands, feet, and face. Whipping, 
confinement in the guard house, carrying a ball and 
chain, and tying up by the thumbs were other punish-
ments awarded to offenders without benefit of a 
trial. ,,7 
The 1916 Articles of War authorized three separate 
types of punishment procedure for miscreant soldiers. 
Air Force lawyer Colonel F. W. Schwekhardt described 
them:S 
1. Punishment imposed by a court-martial in which the 
voluminous and cumbersome rules of evidence and procedure 
protecting the accused are the dominant influence. 
2. Non-judicial punishment imposed by a commander in which 
the group interest in speedy, unencumbered discipline 
dominates. 
3. Curtailment of privileges and the withholding of 
rights on a non-penal basis through authority vested in the 
commanding officer. · 
Punishment under Article 104 of the 1916 Act (the 
predecessor of Article 15) was to be imposed only for 
minor offenses not denied by the accused. Authorized 
punishments included reprimand, withholding of privi-
leges such as passes, imposition of extra duty and 
restriction to quarters. More specific limitations as 
to punishments authorized were added from time to time 
after the First World War, and in 1950 Congress 
codified and adopted the practice of non-judicial 
punishment in Article 15 of the UCMJ.9 
II 
Against this background of legislation and 
tradition, Congress in 1962 amended the provisions of 
Article 15 to increase the punitive authority of 
commanders and to provide a mandatory review of certain 
types of punishment by a member of the local Judge 
Advocate General (JAG) staff. The amended article also 
provided to the serviceman the right to demand a 
court-martial instead of Article 15 punishment. I 0 
Under the current Article 15 the maximum non-
judicial punishment for minor offenses by enlisted 
men depends upon the rank of the commanding officer 
imposing the punishment. Company-grade officers (in 
the Army, lieutenants and captains) are authorized 
To issue a reprimand. 
To restrict a serviceman to quarters for two weeks. 
To impose extra duties for two weeks. 
To put a serviceman in "correctional custody" for 
one week. 
To put shipboard servicemen on bread and water for 
three days. 
To order a forfeiture of one week's pay. 
To detain two weeks pay. 
To reduce a serviceman's rank by one pay-grade. 11 
Field grade officers and above (in the Army, 
majors and above) are authorized 
To issue reprimands. 
To order 60-day restrictions to quarters. 
To impose extra duty for 45 days. 
To put a serviceman in "correctional custody" 
for 30 days. 
To put shipboard personnel on bread and water for 
three days. 
To order forfeiture of one-half a serviceman's pay 
for two months. 
To detain one-half a serviceman's pay for three 
months. 
To reduce the rank of E-4 servicemen and below (in 
the Army corporal or specialist and below) to the 
lowest pay grade and of all other enlisted men two pay 
grades. 12 
A serviceman confronted with an Article 15 has the 
option of accepting the punishment or demanding a 
court-martial before officers other than his commander. 
He is not told the extent of punishment that is to be 
imposed if he accepts the Article 15. He has the right 
of appeal to the next higher dommand after the 
imposition of punishment. 
The option of a court-martial is not available to 
servicemen attached to or aboard a vessel. This excep-
tion was a concession lo Navy authorities who insisted 
that a ship's captain retains "unique responsi-
bilities" for maintaining "morale and discipline 
aboard ship." 13 
III 
Modern argument in favor of non-judicial punish-
ment takes two distinct tacks. On one hand, proponents 
maintain that military command requires such discre-
tionary authority. The argument is as old as the 
military itself. It assumes that there is something 
fundamentally different about justice in the armed 
services and justice everywhere else. It emphasizes 
that the group interest in the army must predominate. 
"Its benefit for society and its purpose is," says 
Colonel Schweikhardt of military justice, "to direct 
the attention of the individual to the need for group 
discipline ... Personal rights are submerged before 
the social interests of an organization or 
community." 14 
On the other hand, proponents contend that Article 
15 is really a munificent gesture by the military to 
the serviceman - or at least benign. Article 15 
punishment does not lead to a record of federal 
conviction, proponents claim, and thus leaves the 
soldier free of any lasting stigma. 
Even reform-minded reporter Robert Sherrill, who 
recommended that military courts be deprived of all 
criminal jurisdiction, wrote: 15 
Article 15 punishments, then, arc not always light. They are 
even severe when one considers that they are handed down 
by the authority of a single officer sitting in splendid 
sourverainete absolue ... But this systrm of punishment 
has the great virtue of not being considered in any way 
the conviction of a crime. The Article 15 process is not a 43 
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part of the court-martial system, so let the military have it. 
Proponents point proudly to the serviceman's right 
to appeal an Article 15 and to his right to demand a 
court-martial in lieu of an Article 15 to vindicate 
himself. Rather than a necessary evil accompanying 
the exigencies of command, they argue, the Article 15 
benefits the serviceman who receives it. That Gl's 
ought to be grateful is the tacit corollary. 
According to one military commentator on military 
law, Congress was duly impressed by the "fact that 
non-judicial punishment would be less harmful to the 
offender than a trial by court-martial ... (italics 
in original)." He also writes that it was in this 
magnanimous mood that Congress amended the Article to 
include the new review, court-martial option and 
appeals provisions. 16 
Critics and advocates of the military justice 
system have argued long and hard about the essence of 
the first rationalization for the Article 15 - the 
use of military justice as a disciplinary device. 
Here there will be a mere assumption that commanding 
officers should have some punitive measures at their 
disposal, but that those measures ought to be the very 
minimum incident to the normal and routine operation 
of a military organization. 
The second rationalization for the Article 15 -
that it is actually beneficial to the serviceman -
has not been adequately examined. Scrutiny of the 
practical use of the Article 15 shows that it is not 
only much more malignant than is commonly believed, but 
that it is the subject of a grave and corrosive 
misconception. 
Non-judicial punishment is primarly the low-ranking 
enlisted man's curse. During the very first two months 
of the operation of the amended Article 15, 71 per cent 
of the cases in which it was used involved men in the 
lowest three enlisted grades, and more than 97 per cent 
involved men in the lowest five enlisted grades (these 
are the only grades ordinarily attainable by draftees 
and three-year enlistees). 17 By comparison, Army man-
power statistics show that on June 30, 1964, 
servicemen and women in the lowest three enlisted 
grades accounted for about 41 per cent of total active 
duty personnel, and the lowest five grades included 
about 74 per cent of total active duty personnel. 18 
Article 15 punishments, swift and summary, fall most 
often upon those servicemen who have had the least 
freedom in choosing their lot in the first place. 
Flogging and other corporal punishments no longer 
have a place in military justice's arsenal. However, 
maximum punishments available to a commanding officer 
under Article 1 5 are by any modern standard Spartan. 
Reduction in pay grade and forfeiture of pay 
financially cripple the GI who even at full scale 
earns far less than his civilian peers. Top fines are. 
equivalent to an entire month's pay, one-twelfth of a 
GI's annual pittance. 
"Correctional custody" is little more than a 
euphemism for imprisonment. More than simply a 
restriction to quarters, it can mean as much as 30-days 
imprisonment in a building that is often contiguous 
with the post stockade and is by regulation designed to 
be austere. The windows are blocked with wire mesh or 
other physical barriers. 19 Guards watch over the 
"confinee's" activities at all hours. Guards may be 
armed with nightsticks. 20 "Confinees" may be put 
in hard labor details. This kind of custody at its 
worst can be about as correctional as a month in the 
Tombs. 
Following some corollary of Parkinson's Law, 
punishments under Article 15 tend toward the maximum. 
A story is told about a company commander at Fort 
Campbell,, Ky., who did not believe in saving anything 
in his disciplinary bag for the worst cases. For his 
not uncommon penchant for handing out "the max" he 
received a nickname. One day the telephone in the 
orderly room rang. It was from the local JAG office. 
A GI who had received one of the company commander's 
maximum non-judicial punishments has consulted with 
JAG lawyers to see if his treatment had been illegally 
severe. The JAG officer told a clerk who had answered 
the telephone, "I want to talk with Captain Max." 
The disciplined GI had given the JAG officer his 
commander's nickname - it was the only name the GI 
knew. 2l 
The responses available to a GI afflicted with an 
Article 15 are even more limited in practice than they 
would seem in the statute. By law as interpreted by 
the military he has no absolute right to consult an 
attorney before deciding whether to accept his punish-
ment. "In practice," wrote Army Captain Harold L. 
Miller in the Military Law Review, "assistance of 
counsel is usually available to Army officers who have 
been offered punishment under Article 15. However, such 
assistance is not normally available to enlisted 
persons ... Should the Army undertake to provide 
counsel to all offenders in Article 15 proceedings, it 
is possible that its legal officers would be over-
whelmed by the mass of cases presented them." 22 
Much can be made of the opportunity to demand a 
court-martial and the right to appeal a non-judicial 
punishment to the next higher command authority after 
imposition. Robert Rivkin in his Draftee's Guide to 
Military Life and Law recommends, "Always consider 
an appeal. The infraction for which an Article 15 is 
given must be an offense against the UCMJ! Always 
check with the JAG Office to make sure the Article 15 
you 're getting is not completely lawless. "23 
Good advice, but advice rarely heeded. Rivkin knows, 
why. Elsewhere in his book he notes that any action by 
a GI to stand on his rights must involve a fundamental 
decision as to whether it is worth the gamble. The 
spirit of the Army is to endure. The effect of an 
appeal, a demand for court-martial or even an inquiry 
at JAG is to make waves. It "behooves the trooper" 
to take his punishment like a man, carp about it 
awhile and then forget it. So goes the wisdom of the 
ordinary GI. And it proves less naive and slavish than 
it may first appear. The man across the table at an 
Article 15 proceeding is none other than the commander 
with whom the accused GI standing at braced attention 
will have to live long after the Article 15 affair 
ends. That commander might also have the power and 
connections to do. the GI much more serious harm than 
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any possible Article 15 punishment would - for example, 
he may be able to connive ordP.rs reassigning the GI to 
a duty station that is less than pleasant, even less 
than safe. The commanding officer wields powers over 
his disciplinee far more ubiquitous than merely the 
formal "non-judicial" one. He is at once the Gl's 
judge, employer, foreman, shop steward, alderman and 
Fate. A GI playing the odds simply will not call his 
commanding officer's bluff. Even for the GI who 
docsn 't figure the odds, accepting the Article 15 is 
directly in line with that great and prudent maxim in 
GI life - Follow the Path of Least Hassle. 
Miller recites data that indicate most GI's do not 
appeal their Article I 5s and that show that most Gls 
do not demand a court-martial. He concludes that 
"offenders are generally satisfied with the fairness 
of the punishments imposed by their commanders."24 
On the contrary, the data show that Gls are realists. 
They know their vulnerability is more certain than 
their rights. That they accept their punishment is a 
measure of their rationality not their satisfaction. 
Congress placed only minimal limits on the 
commander's discretion in administering Article l 5s, 
and the military milieu nearly eradicates even those 
feeble limits. Procedural safeguards prevent only the 
most excessive injustices to Gls; only punishments so 
arbitrary or repetitive as to make life intolerable 
will in most cases overcome the inertia of the GI 
psychology. Immature or maladjusted commanders, there-
fore, have wide leeway for malicious harassment both 
by imposition of non-judicial punishment and by the 
threat of it. 
Analysed in terms of the situation of a short-term 
enlisted man as he lives it, Article 15 non-judicial 
punishment is at best an instrument of authoritarian 
discipline based on the benevolence of men rather 
than the rule of law. At worst it is a medium for 
malice. 
Were that all, however, the proponents of Article 
15 would still have an argument. Servicemen who fall 
prey to it at least don't suffer a permanent scar on 
their records, do they? 
Because of a misconception tacitly sanctioned by 
the Army, the Article 15 may insidiously damage a 
Gl's future. The misconception is that an Article 15 
does not "follow" the GI beyond the duty station at 
which he receives it, that its effect disappears 
automatically. This temporary quality of non-judicial 
punishment is the very basis of the argument that the 
GI benefits from Article 15. An Article 15 punishment 
is not a federal conviction; that much is true. It is 
not an admission of guilt; that is also true. 
But, despite what is taught in military justice 
classrooms in basic training, despite the shared 
wisdom of first sergeants and career NCOs and despite 
the assurances of commanding officers as they urge a 
GI to "sign the papers," the Article 15 does become 
a permanent part of a GI's military record. 25 
Army Regulation 27-10 states that records of 
Article l 5s will be expunged when two years elapse, 
when the GI changes duty station or when punishment is 
withdrawn. An Army spokesman explained how practical 
Army policy is fitted to the regulation. He said that 
the deletion provision of AR 27-10 is "limited to the 
forms actually used in the imposition of punishment." 
In other words, the regulation pertains only to the 
forms actually signed by the GI and has no bearing on 
other records of the punishment. He said no ta lions of 
Article 15s are erased from the personnel records the 
GI sees - the so-called Field 201 Form that a GI 
carries from duty station to duty station to prove he 
has a past. However, the spokesman said, the notation 
of non-judicial punishment is entered permanently on 
the Gl's records "where they are maintained 
permanently." The damage is done without the GI even 
knowing it. The spokesman denied that formal basic 
training in military justice contained any claims that 
no permanent record is kept of Article 15s. Nonetheless, 
that is what is taught at least informally, not only 
by lecturers on military justice in training but also 
by some of the savviest old non-commissioned officers 
in the Army. Army spokesmen admitted that in 1967 the 
Army, in addition to permanent notation, began filing 
reports of persons receiving Article 15s on narcotics 
charges with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs. The Article 15 does not count as a 
federal conviction, but when it comes to drug offenses 
that is about as honest as telling a leukemia patient 
he doesn't have the plague. 
In its own publications on narcotics use, the Army 
is less than candid about its reporting procedures. 
For instance, the Army pamphlet "Drugs and You," 
warns that "another mark on you is that a conviction 
in the military service for a marijuana or other drug 
offense assures that your name and the incident will 
be reported to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous 
Drugs where the record of drug offenders is 
permanently maintained (italics added)." 26 An Article 
15 is not a conviction. But it is reported. 
Army spokesmen contend that the Army's reporting 
procedure is nothing more than compliance with the duty 
owed by any federal state or local government 
organization to keep the federal narcotics agency 
informed. However, the Air Force, a similar federal 
government organization, does not feel constrained to 
issue similar reports, according to an Air Force 
spokesman. He reported that only when the federal 
bureau requested specific information about a particu-
lar case did it feel obliged to disseminate informa-
tion about narcotics violations. He stated that the 
only time this procedure is effected is in cases of 
spectular proportions "such as smuggling, exception-
ally large amounts confiscated, large scale 
trafficking, etc." 
Attorneys for the Lawyers Military Defense 
Committee, a group of lawyers representing Gls in 
Vietnam, reported in the interview immediately 
preceding this article that the Article 15 is becoming 
the common method of dealing with alleged marijuana 
and even heroin violations in Vietnam. Gls who accept 
the "benign" punishment of Article 15 rather than 
seek a vindication in court with the burden of proof 
on the accusors will be surprised to find their govern-
ment records permanently scarred with a history of 
narcotics. No federal offense. No admission of guilt. 
Just a simple dope record put there by a single man 45 
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unrestrained by effective legal procedures. 
The munificence argument - an argument that 
persuades even reform-minded Robert Sherrill - fails 
for two reasons: first, the GI has much less choice 
in practice than he is given in theory because of 
the double role of the officer handing down Article 15 
punishment (as judge and direct commander); second, 
the argument is based on a misconception about the 
temporary quality of Article 15 punishments. 
If, as Sherrill recommends, all criminal cases 
in the military now heard by courts-martial were 
turned over to federal courts, the quality of justice 
affecting most soldiers would still be poor. 
Deprived of its magnanimity argument the military 
may simply retreat to its disciplinary necessity 
justification of summary punishment. No doubt it will. 
Perhaps the argument will unfortunately prevail. But 
in claiming that the Article 15 is a necessary evil, the 
military will have to concede that it is evil. At the 
very least, no American serviceman should have to make 
odds on his future without even knowing his future is 
at stake. 
1 The main character of this sketch is a composite of 
many draftees I knew in basic training. The scene is from my 
training unit, Company C, 9th Battalion, 2nd Basic Combat 
Training Brigade, Fort Bragg, N.C., February through March 
1969. The composite is an impressionistic "average soldier" 
gleaned from my own experiences and long discussions with 
colleagues in basic training and at later duty stations. 
Some soldiers reported that lectures they had received on 
military justice laid more emphasis on the freedom of choice 
between accepting an Article 15 and demanding court-martial. 
But most reported emphasis on the benefits of Article 15. 
For other descriptions of the psychological effects of 
training and Army duty see Bourne, "Some Observations on the 
Psychosocial Phenomena Seen in Basic Training", 30 Psychiatry: 
Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Processes 192 (1967), 
Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front (1928) and Dos 
Passos, Three Soldiers (1921 ). 
2 See 1 Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 5 3-54 
(1886). 
3 This is to be distinguished from summary court-martial 
in the UCMJ which has some aspects of a trial proceeding. 
4 II Writings of Washington 249 (Fitzpatrick ed., 1932). 
5 Miller, "A Long Look at Article 15," 28 Mili Law 
Rev. 40 (1965) (hereafter cited as Miller). 
6 Act of August 29, 1916, ch. 418, S3, art. 104, 39 
Stat. 667. 
7 Miller, note 4 supra, at p. 41. 
8 Schweikhardt, "Non-Judicial Punishment under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice," N.Y. Law Forum 52 (1959) 
(hereafter cited as Schweikhardt). 
9 Uniform Code of Military Justice, Art. 15, 64 stat. 
112 (1950). 
10 Uniform Code of Military Justice, Art. 15, 10 U.S. C. 
Art. 15 (1962). 
11 This can only be done when the office imposing the 
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